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Abstract: - The paper deals with detection of threats in IP telephony, the authors developed a penetration testing system 
that is able to check up the level of protection from security threats in IP telephony. The SIP server is a key komponent 
of VoIP infrastructure and often becomes the aim of attacks and providers have to ensure the appropriate level of 
security. We have developed web-based penetration system which is able to check the SIP server if can face to the 
most common attacks.The developed application is distributed as an open-source and is equipped with four modules. 
The result is reported to the particular e-mail and information supplemeted to the report should help to improve the 
overall protection of the SIP server. The developed application represents effective tool which is able to point out the 
weaknesses of the tested system. 
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1   Introduction 
System designed to test and monitor networks or other 
components are quite wide-spread these days. Examples 
of the principle ones are Nessus [1], Retina [2], Snort [3] 
and other. The majority of these systems allows for 
testing the whole network infrastructures and protocols 
used for communication between components. None of 
these solutions, however, enables a complex testing of 
VoIP infrastructure and SIP servers which are the key 
and most vulnerable component of the network. The 
system we developed, under a working title SPT (SIP 
Penetration Testing), was designed as a penetration tests 
simulator for SIP servers. Based on the analysis of 
intersections, the person who initiated the testing (“the 
tester”) receives feedback in the form of test results, as 
well as recommendations how to mitigate potential 
security risks that were discovered. The advantage of 
this solution is that the system simulates real attacks 
from the external network, i.e. the system does not need 
to be placed in the same network as the target 
component DUT (Device under Test). This is frequently 
one of prerequisites to be able to use other testing tools. 
The SPT system was implemented as a web application 
accessible through a standard web browser and therefore 
independent on the operation system’s platform. As the 
solution was developed as a part of the research intent of 
the CESNET association, this system will also be 
incorporated into its network and will be accessible after 
signing in using the SSO (Single Sign-On) service - 
Shibboleth [4]. This should also prevent the system 
being used for other than testing purposes. Once signed 
in, the tester enters the required data into a web form and 
chooses tests to be run. The output of the application 
once the tests have been completed is an e-mail report to 
the tester. This paper contains the results of the tests; and 
in case some penetrations were successful it also 
contains recommendations and measures to mitigate 
such attacks in the future. Figure 1 illustrates the concept 
of the SPT system. The following chapter describes 
individual testing methods in detail, their 
implementation, algorithms used and the impact on the 
target SIP server. 
 
Fig. 1. SIP Penetration Tests System Scheme. 
 
2   Methods 
Although the system is primarily designed for 
penetration tests on SIP servers, in reality it can perform 
full-scale attacks on a particular component and provide 
feedback on it to the tester. Thus, it is necessary to 
ensure that the developed system cannot be abused by a 
third party. The system was designed as a LAMP (Linux, 
Apache, MySQL, PHP) server [8] and its complete 
administration including the installation is carried out via 
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a web interface. For reasons stated above, the system 
will be incorporated into the CESNET’s network and 
will only be accessible to authorised persons once they 
pass through the authentication.Once the tester fills in 
the IP address or domain name of the central SIP server 
and the email address to which the test results will be 
sent to. Using checkboxes, the tester may define the 
range of the modules offered for testing. Individual 
modules are described below in detail. 
 
2.1 Scanning and Monitoring Module 
In order to be able to carry out an efficient and precise 
attack on a SIP server, the potential attacker needs to 
find out the most information about a particular 
component. This is why we first developed a Scanning 
and Monitoring (“S&M”) module for the SPT system, 
which is used to test the security of the central against 
attacks aimed at obtaining information by means of 
common and available tools (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. SPT System – S&M Module. 
 
These tools include for instance Nmap [9] or ever more 
popular SIPvicious [10]. SPT system also uses these 
testing tools. By means of these tools, it is possible to 
obtain a list of listening ports or a list of user accounts 
created on the central concerned from an unsecured 
server. Where the server is not secured sufficiently, they 
can obtain even the most important, that is passwords to 
individual accounts. If the tester ticks the test to be 
carried out, the Nmap application is used first to 
establish open ports. Given the time requirements of the   
[s] test, the testing is by default restricted only to several 
most frequently used ports. Using the web form, the 
tester can set the range of the tested ports. However the 
total time set for testing using Nmap is 1800s (30 
minutes). The list of available ports is subsequently 
included in the assessment report together with 
recommendations how to minimise such ports’ scanning. 
Another test which the SPT system can carry out aims at 
establishing whether SIP server’s security allows for 
obtaining a list of user accounts. For this purpose, 
SIPvicious is used. By sending out OPTION and ACK 
requests, the application detects what accounts are 
defined on the SIP server. By default, the system tries 
the 100-999 range of accounts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, the tester may define own range of tested 
numbers nrE  or import a text file containing strings of 
alpha-numeric characters or words drE  . Time required 
to check and create a list of eT   [s] accounts can be 
expressed by equation (1) where  0.02603 is a time 
constant obtained by repetitive measurements on a 
sample of 1000 potential accounts on different target SIP 
servers [7]. 
 
cEET drnre ⋅+= )(     (1) 
Number of valid accounts validE  is derived from 
equation (2) where invalidE  is the number of accounts 
that have been reviewed by the system but not defined 
on the SIP server. 
 
invaliddrnrvalid EEEE −+= )(    (2) 
Once the system has tested security of the SIP server 
against detecting accounts, possibility to detect 
passwords for individual accounts is tested. Again, this 
testing is carried out by SIPvicious. Using a pre-defined 
range of possible numeric passwords nrP or an imported 
text file with alpha-numeric characters or words drP  , it 
obtains a list of passwords for individual accounts. Time 
requirements on this test are expressed by the following 
equation (3). 
 
[ ] cPPET drnrvalidp ⋅+⋅= )(    (3) 
 
npesm TTTT ++=     (4) 
 
Now we can determine the estimated time required to 
carry out the complete S&M test  smT  (4). Using the 
TABLE I 
UDPFLOOD ATTACK TIME DURATION WITH DIFFERENT 
BANDWIDTH AND NUMBER OF GENERATED PACKETS 
Number of Packets - 
P n  
Bandwidth [Mbps] and the Attack 
Time udpT [s] 
10 25 50 100 
100 000 113,12 45,25 22,63 11,31 
200 000 226,24 90,50 45,26 22,62 
300 000 339,36 135,75 67,89 33,93 
400 000 452,48 181 90,52 45,24 
500 000 565,60 226,25 113,15 56,55 
600 000 678,72 271,5 135,78 67,86 
700 000 791,84 316,75 158,41 79,17 
800 000 904,96 362 181,04 90,48 
900 000 1018,08 407,25 203,67 101,79 
1 000 000 1131,20 452,5 226,3 113,1 
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module, we can verify whether the target SIP server is 
sufficiently secured against such scanning and 
monitoring attacks. 
 
2.2  Denial of Service Module 
One of the most frequently occurring attacks is DoS 
(Denial of Service). In reality, it consists of several 
attacks with the same characteristic feature – to lock up 
or restrict the availability of the attacked service so that 
it does not function properly. Several types of DoSs [11] 
can be used to achieve this; our system tests the SIP 
server using the most frequently used one, Flood DoS. 
The principle of the attack is to send a large volume of 
adjusted or otherwise deformed packets to the target 
component so that it is unable to provide its core 
services. As a result of the attack, CPU load increases 
and most of the available bandwidth is consumed, 
resulting in the SIP server being unable to service 
regular calls, or only a minimum amount of them. To 
generate Flood DoS, the SPT system uses two 
applications: udpflood and inviteflood [12]. When using 
udpflood, the system generates UDP packets of 1400 
bytes which are directed at SIP default port 5060 of the 
target SIP server. The tester defines the number of 
generated packets and the system tests whether the 
packets arrived at the SIP server and whether they cause 
some restriction of the service availability, see Figure 3. 
Since we know the packet’s size and therefore also the 
size of the Ethernet framework udpFs , we can, based on 
the number of generated packets nP   and the bandwidth 
provided wB  , determine time udpT   [s] required to carry 
out the test (5). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. SPT System - DoS Module. 
 
( ) /udp udp n wT Fs P B= ⋅     (5)   
 
Table 1 provides an overview of time required for 
different numbers of generated packets nP   and different 
bandwidth wB  . When the other application, inviteflood, 
is used for testing, the system generates INVITE 
requests at the SIP server which are directed at an 
existing account. This method is very successful as most 
of today’s SIP servers require an authentication for 
INVITE requests. As the INVITE requests generated by 
our system do not contain any authentication string, the 
SIP server returns SIP answer 407 Proxy Authentication 
Required. With the large volume of incoming requests, 
the load of SIP server’s CPU increases. The tester can 
set the value of a valid account in the system manually, 
or it can be randomly selected from the previously 
obtained list of valid accounts validE  . As in the previous 
case, we can, based on the number of generated packets  
nP  and the bandwidth provided wB , determine time  
inviteT  [s] required to carry out the test (6). 
 
( ) /invite invite n wT Fs P B= ⋅    (6) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the change in 
bandwidth on CPU load when simulating an udpflood 
attack. The chart also clearly shows resistance of the two 
popular open-source SIP servers, Asterisk PBX [5] and 
OpenSIPS [6], to UDP Flood DoS attacks. Both centrals 
have been installed on the same HW of Dell PowerEdge 
R510 server to eliminate any potential difference in 
computational performance. To change bandwidths, we 
used HW emulator of the Simena networks. CPU load 
on individual centrals was measured by means of dstat 
[13]. The chart shows that OpenSIPS is many times 
more resistant to UDP DoS attaks than Asterisk. Total 
time required to carry out DoS tests dosT   is determined 
as follows (7). 
inviteudpdos TTT +=     (7) 
 
Results and success rate of DoS tests carried out are 
included in the report for the tester. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Impact of change in bandwidth on CPU load in 
case of udpflood attack. 
 
 
 
ADVANCES in DATA NETWORKS, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS
ISSN: 1792-6157 127 ISBN: 978-960-474-245-5
2.3  Registration Manipulation Module 
Once the potential perpetrator obtains information about 
existing accounts, he can manipulate these accounts 
quite easily. The SPT system we developed can also test 
SIP servers’ security, i.e. measures against manipulating 
the registration, see Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. SPT System - RM Module. 
 
To carry out this test, the system uses reghijacker [12] 
which substitutes the legitimate account registration with 
a fake, non-existing one. This type of attack can easily 
be expanded to a so called MITM, Man-in-the-Middle 
[11]. In this attack, a non-existent user is substituted by a 
valid SIP registration and all incoming signalling and 
media to the legitimate registration will be re-directed to 
the newly created registration. In this case, the tester 
needs to define the value of the SIP account which is to 
be stolen in the system and where authentication of 
REGISTER request is allowed, also a password to this 
account. Where the tester fails to define these values, the 
system automatically assigns an account and its 
password from the list created while scanning and 
monitoring the central. Time required to carry out the 
test   is insignificant compared to operational times of 
other modules.  
 
2.4  SPIT Module 
Today, one of the most popular attacks on the Internet is 
spam. It is estimated that spams account for 80 - 90% of 
total attacks on the Internet. Security experts predict that 
Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) will be a major 
threat in the future. The level of annoyance is even 
greater than with classical spam. Out team in CESNET 
had developed SPITFILE [14] which served as a testing 
tool while developing security against such type of 
attacks. The SPT system uses the core of this 
application, together with Sipp [14], to simulate a SPIT 
attack on the target SIP server (Figure 6). In the form, 
the tester defines the value of a valid SIP account – the 
called party to which the SPIT call will be directed and 
then the value and password to a valid SIP account – the 
caller through which the call will be initiated. Where the 
tester fails to define these values, the system 
automatically assigns an account and an appropriate 
password from the list created while scanning and 
monitoring the central. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. SPT System - SPIT Module. 
 
If the attack was successful, a SIP call is initiated from 
the caller’s account, and the end device with the 
registered account of the called party starts ringing. Once 
the call is answered, a pre-recorded message is played 
and the call terminated. Time required to carry out the 
test  spitT  is determined by the length of the pre-recorded 
message. The final report on penetration tests which the 
tester receives via e-mail, will, besides information on 
all previous tests, also contain an analysis and success 
rate of the SPIT module’s test. 
 
Fig. 7. Division of the SPT system into individual 
modules. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the division of the SPT system into 
individual modules and shows time intervals necessary 
to carry out individual tests in respective modules. Time 
requirements of the whole SPT system can be expressed 
by equation (8). Its value depends on many factors and 
can radically change in accordance with the type of tests 
requested by the tester. Its value is for reference only. 
 
spitrmdossmspt TTTTT +++=    (8) 
 
3   Results 
Although the SPT system is still in the phase of intensive 
testing and development, basic operational tests of all 
available modules were carried out. Each test is 
accompanied by a short description of countermeasure’s 
principles and methods [12] which should limit or 
completely mitigate potential security gaps that were 
revealed during SIP servers’ testing.  
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Fig. 8. SIP Penetration Tests System Testbed. 
 
     Figure 8 describes the basic testing topology. The 
system  is denoted as SPT and Asterisk as VoIP PBX. 
Asterisk was installed at Dell PowerEdge R510 server. 
 
 
3.1 Scanning and Monitoring  
The first step was to record SIP server’s IP address and 
the e-mail address to send the final report to. Next, the 
S&M module and subsequently Nmap and SIPvicious 
applications were launched. Values for Nmap were set 
by default, value of nrE for SIPvicious was set to range 
between 1000-9999. The device found all three 
registered accounts  validE  7001-7003 and listed open 
TCP and UDP ports at Asterisk. Once   nrP  was set to 
7001-7003 and a text file  drP  containing test and 
7003ab string, the test to obtain passwords to individual 
accounts was also successful. Total time incurred on 
testing module   ≅smT 235s. If we had to protect and 
prevent SIP server from scanning and monitoring, then 
an implementation of firewall is the effective solution or 
an intrusion detection system that is able to distinguish 
scanning and monitoring. The next effective solution is 
to divide the network logical infrastructure into VLANs 
and decompose the provided services into more physical 
servers (TFTP, HTTP servery). The prevention of 
accounts and passwords detection is difficult, moreover, 
the tools for detection apply the standard SIP methods 
and is not trivial to distinguish legitiamte behaviour from 
an attack. In this case, there is recommended to divide 
the infrastructure into inidividual VLANs so that the 
detection for intruder was as difficult as possible. 
 
3.2  Denial of Service  
Using udpflood, the tester sent 500000 UDP packets 
directly to port 5060. Bandwidth was set to 100Mbps, 
Asterisk processed 90% calls. Once the test was 
completed, Asterisk recovered to a full operation mode. 
To be able to compare, we substituted Asterisk by 
OpenSIPS in this test. Call processing under the same 
attack was entirely error-free. When testing using 
inviteflood on the valid account 7001, we found out that 
this attack is much more destructive in terms of 
computational power. As early as at 100000 INVITE 
request when  inviteT ≅    9s, CPU load for both Asterisk 
and OpenSIPS reached 100% and failed to process a 
single incoming or outgoing call. Once the test was 
completed, both centrals recovered to a full operation 
mode. The possibilities, how to protect from Flood DoS 
attacks, are the following:  to divide the netowrk 
infrastructure into separate VLANs,  to have in use 
solely TLS, to implement L2 network elements with 
DoS detection or to apply SIP firewall that can detect 
DoS attacks and minimalize their impact. 
 
3.3 Registration Manipulation 
When testing possibility for registration manipulation, 
we entered values of account 7003 and its password 
7003ab manually into the system. Once the test was 
completed, we established whether the attack was 
successful. The aim of the attack was to de-register 
account 7003 and to direct all incoming calls to a fake 
account which does not exist. Thus, calls were 
terminated as unconnected. The call to 7003 was not put    
through. The TCP protocol is recommended at transport 
level to prevent a registration hijacking because the 
manipulation with TCP requires higher complexity.  
Next option, how to minimalize this threat, is to use  
REGISTER message authentication.  We could decrease 
the registration interval, as well, it is quite simple but 
effective. 
 
3.4 Spam over Internet Telephony 
As stated above, we used SPITFILE application, 
developed by this paper’s authors, to test the central’s 
vulnerability to SPIT attacks. The tester entered 
manually into the system the value of a valid account 
7002 on which a SPIT attack was to be initiated, as well 
as the value of a valid account 7003 and password to it 
(7003ab) which was supposed to initiate the SPIT call. 
Once the test was launched, SPITFILE registered on the 
participant 7003 and then started to generate a call to 
account 7002. The end device registered on 7002 began 
ringing, and once the call was answered, a recording 
with an advertisement was played. A few methods exist 
how to restrict the SPIT propagation, which are more or 
less efficient, but their combination bring quit strong 
protection against the type of attack. Among these 
methods the utilization of the various automatically or 
manually editable lists belong, on their base the call is 
permitted or prohibited, eventually an interaction with 
voice menu can be the effective protection against call 
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bots. Authors developed own solution ANTISPIT [14] 
that exploits the specific human behaviour and 
automatically modifies the Blacklist table without 
participation of called party, the approach is based on the 
statistical Blacklist. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
The aim of the authors was to develop a tool to carry out 
penetration tests on SIP servers. The system that was 
designed and implemented consists of several modules 
that are able to generate selected types of attacks which 
the authors deem most popular. The system then 
analyses to what extent is the target component secured, 
drafts assessments containing tests’ results and proposes 
factual recommendations to ensure security against the 
threat concerned. The assessment report is sent as a text 
document to an e-mail. The system is currently under 
intensive testing. It is planned that in the future, it will be 
extended to include other testing modules and functions 
such as for instance testing of the whole VoIP 
infrastructure and heavy testing of individual 
components. 
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